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Book Reviews
analysis would have to be longitudinal, to
discover what went wrong, and how did
the HRCs and the politicians who shape
their mandate stray from the original
goals; and what went right. One principle
to keep in mind is that human rights have
always been articulated as solutions to a
perceived "problem." When human rights
legislation first appeared in the 1950s and
early 60s, prejudice and discrimination
were usually considered individual is-
sues; the "barrel" was sound, but there
were some "rotten apples" that needed to
be identified and corrected. Discrimina-
tion does continue in Canadian society,
some of it perpetrated by pathological
individuals and most is the "systemic"
kind. Attention has shifted to the "barrel"
itself. If the definition of the problem has
changed since the institution of HRCs, it
follows quite logically that the solution(s)
too must be reconsidered.
Fortunately open discussion is oc-
curring at this moment, and for this Ezra
Levant deserves considerable credit. Ever
since his YouTube and blog reportage
began, human rights have been receiving
much more attention from the daily press,
from elected politicians and from alerted
citizens. His "army of Davids," initially in
the blogosphere, has gone mainstream.
Levant's contribution is not so much his
argument as his example: the success of
his campaign to date is a testament to
the power of free expression, a demon-
stration of civil society engagement with
fundamental issues and entrenched insti-
tutions, and a reminder that with the new
technology of YouTube and the Internet,
journalism and public communications
have been democratized and can no
longer be dominated by governments
and elites. Despite his flawed analysis,
he has opened a debate and extended it
beyond the traditional human rights con-
stituency. It would be a serious mistake
simply to refute his argument and ignore
the long-term opportunities that are now
available to listen to those actually fac-
ing the problem of discrimination, so
that a more realistic definition can lead
to more effective solutions. The trumpet
has sounded.
James W. St.G. Walker*
University of Waterloo
* James Walker is Professor of History at the
University of Waterloo, author of "Race,"
Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court
of Canada (1997), and co-editor of Critical
Mass: The Emergence of Global Civil Society
(2008). He has a study in progress on the 1960s
campaign to criminalize "hate propaganda"
in Canada.
Corporate Social Responsibility:
A Legal Analysis, by Michael Kerr,
Richard Janda & Chip Pitts (Chip
Pitts ed., LexisNexis Canada 2009)
650 pages, ISBN 9780433451150.
The notion that businesses should respect
human rights and consider the social and
environmental effects of their actions
has gained both broad acceptance and
significance. Accordingly, the publica-
tion of Corporate Social Responsibility
is very timely. For the authors of this
comprehensive text, corporate social
responsibility (CSR) reflects the necessary
balance among the interests of a corpo-
ration's stakeholders, including not only
shareholders, but also employees, credi-
tors, business partners, neighbors, and
others who are or may be affected by the
corporation's actions. CSR is thus largely
synonymous with such broad phrases
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as "corporate citizenship,"' "corporate
responsibility,"' and "the triple-bottom-
line."3 The field of CSR has increasingly
emphasized that the "social" prong (as
distinguished from the "environmental"
prong of CSR) must be significantly
informed, if not largely determined,
by the human rights responsibilities of
business.
The goal of the three authors-
Michael Kerr, Richard Janda, and Chip
Pitts (who also edited the volume)-is
"not to proclaim that corporations are
socially responsible," but rather "to show
that the law now weighs in to give sub-
stance, meaning, and accountability to
CSR undertakings."' For the most part, the
authors are successful in achieving this
objective, and indeed, they demonstrate
a tendency for national and international
legal systems around the world, increas-
ingly to require some form of corporate
social conscience. In fact, nations as
diverse as China and the United King-
dom have taken remarkable steps toward
this end in recent years. Nonetheless, at
times their reading of the situation may
be somewhat optimistic, in the sense
that much work by governments and
corporations themselves remains to be
done to ensure that corporations actually
behave in a socially responsible fashion.
While the book is more descriptive than
normative, any analysis of current law
may not give sufficient emphasis to the
need for further effort to achieve CSR
more effectively.
The book is organized around seven
principles that constitute CSR: integrated,
sustainable decision-making; stakeholder
engagement; transparency; consistent best
practices; the precautionary principle; ac-
countability; and community investment.
National and international law has increas-
ingly incorporated these principles, making
a significant impact on the growth of CSR.
In tracing these developments and orga-
nizing them into a conceptual structure of
seven principles, the authors have made
a useful contribution to the field of CSR
by highlighting CSR as an important legal
domain for the twenty-first century.
The authors place each of the seven
principles within a historical timeline
that both counters arguments that cor-
porations are required by law to be
1. The authors note that corporate citizenship is exemplified by the principles provided by
the Boston College Center for Corporate Citizenship (CCC). These principles include the
need for corporations: (1) to minimize harm; (2) to maximize the social and economic
benefit of shareholders and other stakeholders; (3) to be accountable to key stakeholders;
and (4) to return a profit to its shareholders, available at http://www.bcccc.net/index.
cfm?pageld=2007.
2. Corporate responsibility has been "described in terms of company considering, managing
and balancing the economic, social and environmental impacts of its activities .... It
is also about companies taking an 'enlightened self-interest' approach to considering
the legitimate interests of a company's shareholders." PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMM. ON CORPS.
& FIN. SERVS., COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: MANAGING RISK AND CREATING
VALUE (2006) 2.7; see Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate 41 (29 June 2009),
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/benedict-xvi/encyclicals/documents/
hfben-xvi enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritateen.html ("business enterprise involves a
wide range of values").
3. The concept of the triple-bottom-line is an attempt to compromise between the traditional
monetary bottom line and the need to take into account social justice and environmental
quality.
4. MICHAEL KERR, RICHARD JANDA & CHIP PITTS, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 2-3
(Chip Pitts ed., 2009).
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"pathologically" devoted to profit,5 and
indicates that any tendency towards
requiring corporations to be constituted
solely for the profit of shareholders is an
historical anomaly. Corporations have
always been required to consider other
stakeholders, and, indeed, the creation
of the corporation as a legal entity was
premised upon the interests of broader
range of stakeholders.6 In addition, the
book persuasively argues that the debate
surrounding the establishment of volun-
tary or mandatory requirements for CSR
is wrongheaded and misleading. Rather
corporations should be encouraged to act
responsibly within the "shadow of the
law,"7 and corporations and governments
should work together to establish regula-
tions that are mutually acceptable.
The first principle-integrated, sustain-
able decision-making-is the keystone
to CSR and to all seven principles.
"Integrated" decision-making focuses
on what interests the board of directors
of a corporation is required, or permit-
ted, to consider when making decisions.
For example, the authors ask whether a
board can, or should, consider the harm
to employees that closing a plant would
entail. Or, in the alternative, is a board
required to consider only the interest
of the shareholders?8 The authors argue
that the shareholder primacy view of
the corporation as a "pathological" en-
tity designed to maximize shareholder
wealth is an historical anomaly and that
the case for its existence is overstated
in regard to most countries' laws. The
authors are persuasive on this point by
illustrating both established law, as well
as an increasing trend towards requiring
some form of corporate consideration of
non-shareholder stakeholders. They note
Germany's long-standing requirement of
employee representation on the board of
directors and three decisions of Supreme
Courts in Canada that arguably destroy
any notion of shareholder primacy in
Canada.9 The first, Teck Corp. v. Mil-
lar,10 ruled that directors' fiduciary duties
were owed to the corporation generally
rather than specifically to shareholders.
The second, Peoples Department Stores
Inc. v. Wise," reaffirmed this principle,
overruling a decision by a board of di-
rectors that did not consider the interests
of a creditor group and arguably ruling
that a director's duty of care extends to
any person the corporation injures or to
which it is liable for reparation.2 Peoples
was recently reaffirmed in the case of
BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders,13 in
5. See JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER 36 (2005).
6. KERR, JANDA & PITTS, supra note 4, at 63.
7. "In the shadow of the law" is a phrase indicating the way ethical norms evolve when
they are affected by the law, but not directly ruled by it. The authors also use the phrase
"enforced self-regulation" to indicate the relationship between commercial practice and
the drafting of law. Id. at 486-87.
8. The authors cite as representative of this view: Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman,
The End of History for Corporate Law (Harvard Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. for Law,
Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 280, 2000), available at htto://www.law.harvard.
edu/programs/olin center/corporate-governancelpapers/No280.00.Hansmann-Kraakman.
pdf (for the proposition that shareholder primacy had reached a global consensus, i.e.
"the end of history").
9. KERR, JANDA & PITTs, supra note 4, at 142-43, 445.
10. Teck Corp. v. Millar, [1972] 33 D.L.R. (3d) 288 (B.C.S.C.).
11. Peoples Dep't Stores Inc. v. Wise, [20041 3 S.C.R. 461.
12. KERR, JANDA & PITTS, supra note 4, 123-24.
13. BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, [20081 3 S.C.R. 560, 39.
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which the authors note that the Supreme
Court of Canada highlighted the require-
ment that directors act "responsibly" and
that corporations were expected to be
"responsible corporate citizens." 4
When addressing the situation in the
United States, however, the authors of-
fer a useful correction to the lingering
over-emphasis on shareholder primacy
that has influenced law and business
students, as well as corporate finance
professionals over the last three decades.
With Professors Lynn Stout, for instance,
they correctly point out that Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co.'5 has been misread by
many academics and courts to indicate
a shareholder primacy view, when in
fact the case as properly read does not
reinforce that proposition. 6 They also
point to the constituency statutes passed
in many states which explicitly permit
(or require as in Connecticut) directors
to consider constituencies other than
shareholders. Both of these arguments
work to demonstrate that shareholder
primacy is not completely dominant
in the United States. Although neither
argument is oriented towards Delaware,
where more than 40 percent of all US
public companies are incorporated, the
authors do point to the Unocal-Revlon-
Time Warner' 7 line of cases to suggest
that Delaware does not accept a share-
holder primacy view. In these cases,
the Delaware Supreme Court adopted,
and then retreated from, a share price
maximization rule-even in buyout
situations where one would expect the
rule to be at its strongest. Far from being
of limited applicability, these cases do
tend to reinforce the authors' point that
shareholders' interests are not the only in-
terests directors are legally encouraged to
consider. Regarding constituency statutes,
the authors acknowledge that such provi-
sions were often formulated primarily to
prevent hostile takeover and are permis-
sive in all states except Connecticut.' 8 Of
course, the mixed motives of legislators
in adopting these state statutes in no way
undermines the fact that the statutes by
their literal language and practical use
justify the actions of directors. As the
authors point out, corporate directors
in the United States and in many other
countries take actions on a daily basis
aimed at wider stakeholder interests than
the narrower interests of shareholders. In
so doing, corporate directors are com-
forted that such actions are appropriately
14. KERR, JANDA & PITrs, upra note 4, at 129.
15. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
16. Lynn. A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v Ford (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law
& Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 07-11, 2007); see also, Ian B. Lee,
Is There a Cure for Corporate "Psychopath)'?, 42 AM. Bus. LJ. 65, 72 (2005) (noting
that discussions of Dodge often forget that "the court ultimately refused to interfere with
management's plan to expand production and reduce prices because the judges were
not certain that the plan would not ultimately result in greater profits.") (cited in KERR,
JANDA & PIUrS, supra note 4, at 112-14).
17. See Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAn-
drews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986); Paramount Commc'ns
Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989). In Unocal the court ruled that
directors under threat of a hostile takeover could consider the effect of the takeover on
the company in determining whether to accept the bid. In Revlon, however, the court
ruled that a board should not consider non-shareholder interests and that it must sell
to the highest bidder. Time limited the reach of Revlon duties and allowed directors to
engage in longer-term planning without abandoning it for short-term share price.
18. KERR, JANDA & PiUs, supra note 4, at 139.
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protected under the flexibility allowed
by the business judgment rule and by
recent statutes and codes, such as those in
China and the United Kingdom, expressly
contemplating corporate actions that
take social responsibility into account.
As a result, the many CSR reports now
issued each year in the United States and
other nations routinely discuss and take
evident pride in such corporate actions.
Nonetheless, the pursuit of corporate
social responsibility in the United States
lags behind the CSR activities of many
other countries. Accordingly, integrated,
sustainable decision-making has a way to
go before it becomes firmly established
globally.
Although the authors discuss the
legal sources of "sustainable" decision-
making (under their first principle), some
additional operational examples of how
the concept works in corporate practice
could, perhaps, have been useful. Given
the substantial legal discussion and the
objective of the book as a legal and not
an operational treatise, it might not be
fair to expect more of the authors.
The second principle of CSR, stake-
holder engagement, is rooted in concepts
similar to integrated decision-making.
Unlike integrated decision-making,
stakeholder engagement indicates an
affirmative obligation on the part of
corporations not only to consider other
stakeholders, but also to incorporate
them into decision-making processes.
Stakeholder engagement is necessary
because corporations are, at least in part,
entities designed to create social value-
and not merely value for shareholders.
The authors argue, "[llf corporations are
allowed to exist because they are the
best available governance tool to produce
social value, they must nevertheless co-
ordinate with stakeholders and operate
within socially legitimated norms in order
for that social value to be produced." 19
The authors see stakeholder engagement
both as explicit in several examples they
trace in this and other chapters and as
"implicit" within many countries' corpo-
rate, labor, insolvency, indigenous, and
environmental laws.2 0 In Canada, they
note that the director's fiduciary duty to
consider "the interests of shareholders,
employees, suppliers, creditors, consum-
ers, governments and the environment,"
21
as set forth in the Canadian Supreme
Court decisions discussed above, allows
and will generally constitute a de facto
obligation to consult and engage with
other stakeholders. In Europe, stakeholder
engagement is firmly entrenched and
can be seen in the general obligation
of employers to consult with employees
about fundamental business changes as
required by the Charter of the Funda-
mental Social Rights of Workers.22 In the
United States, the principle of stakeholder
engagement is less well established; the
authors point mainly to specific legal
contexts-such as insolvency law, labor
law, environmental law, and the use of
shareholder proposals by human rights
groups and other stakeholders to raise
stakeholder concerns in the decision-
making process. Internationally, voluntary
codes, such as the OECD Principles of
Corporate Governance and the Global
Reporting Initiative, are influential in
working to ensure that stakeholder in-
terests should be protected by granting
Id. at 168.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 172 (quoting Peoples Dep't Stores Inc. v. Wise, 20041 3 S.C.R. 461, 482.)
Id. at 193; see COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN CMTYS., CHARTER OF THE FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL RIGHTS OF
WORKERS (1990).
2010
HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
stakeholders a place in the corporate
governance process. To demonstrate
how the principle of stakeholder en-
gagement works in practice, the authors
helpfully relate BP's experience with the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project. In
the course of the project, BP received
numerous complaints from people who
lived near the pipeline project and from
international humanitarian organizations,
including Amnesty International. BP
responded by creating the independent
Caspian Development Advisory Panel to
raise stakeholders' concerns and advise
BP of the best way of addressing those
concerns.
2 3
The third CSR principle is transpar-
ency. Transparency ensures account-
ability and prevents corporations from
falsely claiming to be following CSR
principles. The authors point to a host
of public accountability statutes in
Canada, France, the United States, and
other countries that, they note, have
forced companies to disclose elements
of CSR. In the United States, the Security
Exchange Commission's Regulation S-K
requires listed companies to report the
effects of compliance with environmental
laws and large judicial or administrative
proceedings, including those involving
social issues. The authors also discuss
Kasky v. Nike, Inc.24 in which Nike was
sued for false representation over press
releases falsely claiming that its products
were produced in accordance with its
corporate code of conduct and were free
from sweatshop labor.
The fourth CSR principle is consistent
best practices, which addresses the prob-
lem of inconsistency. Multinationals oper-
ating in different countries are subjected
to different practical, legal, and normative
standards. To attain true corporate social
responsibility it is necessary for corpo-
rations to apply the same standards of
corporate behavior throughout the world.
Consistent best practices requires corpo-
rations to "strive to treat like situations
alike and to the greatest extent possible
apply consistent environmental and so-
cial standards throughout their business
operations; and strive to consistently ap-
ply the highest global environmental and
social standards throughout their business
operations, regardless of whether such
operations take place within or outside
of their home country."25 Consistent best
practices is perhaps most valuable for its
potential to prevent a race-to-the-bottom.
The authors focus on how parent-subsid-
iary law is increasingly making it difficult
for transnational corporations to create
barriers to legal liability for actions that
occurred in other countries. Additionally,
international law increasingly requires
governments to enforce corporate com-
pliance with international standards and
firms themselves to be subject to interna-
tional standards. This movement within
international law is demonstrated by the
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transna-
tional Corporations and Other Businesses
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights
(Sub-Commission Norms).26 Despite
noting a certain amount of controversy
surrounding the Sub-Commission Norms,
the authors support the Sub-Commission
Norms, which along with other UN ac-
tions, at the very least, make clear "that
KERR, JANDA & Pirs, supra note 4, at 211-25.
Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002).
KERR, JANDA & Pius, supra note 4, at 286.
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enter-
prises with Regard to Human Rights, adopted 13 Aug. 2003, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n
on Hum. Rts., 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003); see David
Weissbrodt, Business and Human Rights, 74 UNIv. CINCINNATI L. REV. 55 (2005).
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the status quo is not acceptable and
concrete action at the international level
... is of the utmost importance."27 As
the authors say, "it is worth noting that
these various hard and soft law standards
[included in the Sub-Commission Norms]
further define the points on the [consis-
tent best practices] compass available to
companies as they try to navigate the ups
and downs and twists and turns of a new
global landscape." 28
The fifth principle the authors espouse
is the precautionary principle. In terms of
CSR, the precautionary principle requires,
"An absence of conclusive scientific
evidence that serious and irreversible
environmental harm will occur within
their sphere of influence must not deter
corporations from taking cost-effective
precautionary measures." 29 The authors
discuss at length some of the scholarly
critiques of the precautionary principle,
most notably Cass Sunstein's argument
that the precautionary principle is "liter-
ally incoherent" 30 because it is unable
to grapple with the comparative risks
of alternatives. The authors point out,
however, that while alternate paths taken
because of the precautionary principle
may still pose risks, the precautionary
principle still has value if the alternative
risks are either better known or pose less
of a severe, long-term risk than the aban-
doned path. They also stress the flexibility
that the precautionary principle gives
corporations. Because it is a principle
and not a rule, corporations are free to
apply it with "the creativity and flexibility
to craft precautionary strategies in a man-
ner sensitive to their unique, economic,
social, and political circumstances."31
Accountability is the sixth principle
of effective CSR. Without some form of
accountability, corporations will lack the
requisite motivation to act in socially
responsible ways and victims of irrespon-
sible behavior will be unable to receive
compensation for the harm done to them.
To represent the growing trend to make
US corporations accountable for their ac-
tions wherever they may have occurred,
the authors look to the Alien Tort Statute,32
Sarbanes Oxley,33 and the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act,34 all of which make cor-
porations accountable for their conduct
throughout the world. In Canada, Peoples
serves to make corporations accountable
to those they injure and to require direc-
tors to consider those they may harm.35
Additionally, the UN Global Compact,36
the ILO Tripartite Declaration,37 and the
27. KERR, JANDA & PITTS, supra note 4, at 317.
28. Id. at 315.
29. Id. at 347.
30. Id. at 354 (quoting CASS SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 4
(2005)).
31. Id. at 358-59.
32. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2006). Though the Alien Tort Statute has led to
few cases finding corporate liability, corporations have nonetheless chosen to settle
some cases for significant sums. See Jad Mouawad, Shell To Pay $15.5 Million To Settle
Nigerian Case, N.Y. TIMES, 8 June 2009.
33. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
34. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §78dd-1 to -78ff (2006).
35. Peoples Dep't Stores Inc. v. Wise, [20041 3 S.C.R. 461.
36. The UN Global Compact, The Ten Principles, available at http://www.unglobalcompact.
org/content/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html
37. Procedure for the Examination of Disputes Concerning the Application of the Tripartite
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy by
2010
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OECD Guidelines for Multinational En-
terprises 8 not only evidence a growing
international consensus that corporations
must be held accountable for their ac-
tions, but also demonstrate corporations
are increasingly subject to stronger ac-
countability mechanisms even under the
auspices of these traditionally weaker
procedures. While these procedures and
their accountability mechanisms are not
yet as strong for example as the Alien
Tort Statute and its foreign analogues,
or the criminal, tort, and administrative
law mechanisms traced by the authors,
they increasingly facilitate various forms
of complaint mechanisms to foster ac-
countability that cannot be ignored. At
the very least, it is clear that corporations
must be cognizant of the potential, social,
reputational, and legal consequences of
engaging in irresponsible behavior.
The last principle the authors believe
to be necessary for CSR is community
investment. For them, CSR does not re-
quire corporations merely to do no harm
to the environment and to society. Rather,
corporations must actively seek to benefit
the public good. Community investment
is of particular import in areas in which
corporations extract resources, but which
do not benefit from the corporation's
presence. There are many ways in which
corporations can seek to invest in the
community. As an example, the authors
discuss the "socio-economic" relation-
ship between aboriginal communities
and mining companies in Canada, which
include preferential hiring and firing
provisions for aboriginal people, as well
as a wide variety of other provisions
designed to benefit the community and
make the corporation's presence mutually
satisfactory.39
In addition to laying out the seven
principles of CSR, the authors also argue
that the debate between the enactment
of mandatory laws on CSR and voluntary
corporate rulemaking is wrongheaded
and misleading. Rather, they suggest that
corporations should be encouraged to
engage in corporate social responsibility
through "enforced self-regulation in the
shadow of the law."4" Another term for
this process is "doctrinal feedback." 41
Laws should be made to encourage or
require corporations to act responsibly,
but they should also be made in col-
laborative processes including both busi-
nesses and governments and should not
pre-empt corporate self-regulation. The
authors point out that this process is not
new. The Uniform Commercial Code 42
was drafted in a similar way, synthesizing
formal law and commercial practice.43 It
seems fitting and practical that law requir-
ing responsible social behavior would be
implemented in a similar way.
In this context the book might have
benefited from increased discussion of
how stakeholders are identified. Integrat-
ed decision-making is necessary to ensure
that corporations consider the interests
Means of Interpretation of Its Provisions, adopted by the Governing Body of the Inter-
national Labour Office at its 232d Sess., Geneva (Mar. 1986), Annexed to the Tripartite
Declaration.
38. ORC. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRISES, REVISION (2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf.
39. KERR, JANDA & PIns, supra note 4, at 503-10.
40. Id. at 486.
41. Id. at 487.
42. AM. LAW INST., NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
OFFICIAL TEXT AND COMMENTS (2008).
43. KERR, JANDA & PITTs, supra note 4, at 487.
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of non-shareholders, but nonetheless
the authors implicitly place the onus of
identifying stakeholders upon directors.
While corporations might easily pinpoint
shareholders, employees, suppliers,
creditors, consumers, and the environ-
ment, predicting the specific impact of a
corporation's activities upon individuals
located near its facilities, the families of
its workers, persons impacted by the hu-
man rights abuses of its business partners,
or those affected by environmental harms
produced by the company would prob-
ably prove more difficult. Many of these
individuals likely lie only on the fringes
of a corporation's sphere of influence,
but they can nonetheless be severely
harmed by a corporation's activities. The
authors do, however, mention at several
points the need to consider such fringe
stakeholders, even writing that determin-
ing these stakeholders is a "key task"
that corporations ignore "at their peril."
44
Identifying such fringe stakeholders is in-
dispensable not only to avoiding risk, but
to seizing opportunities-particularly in
countries where economic development
and poverty reduction are important. The
magnitude and interrelationship of these
persistent problems, and the apparent
limits of state capacity to deal with them,
suggest that if progress is to be achieved,
corporations must play an increasing role
in being part of the solutions and not the
problems associated with globalization
(especially when it comes to advancing
economic, social, and cultural rights). The
concluding chapters of the book provide
some illustrations of "new governance"
approaches along these lines. Nonethe-
less, putting the onus on corporations'
directors to determine who is or is not
a stakeholder could sometimes result in
the identification of stakeholders being
a business decision and may encourage
corporations to ignore outlying stakehold-
ers-at least up to the point at which the
identification is too late and the legal,
social, or environmental risks associated
with the unidentified stakeholders are
all too clear. Accordingly, the authors
emphasize human rights impact assess-
ment as part of the due diligence process
endorsed by the United Nations.
This new book-Corporate Social
Responsibility-is valuable in the way it
brings together international law and the
domestic law of a variety of countries to
examine the changing face of the subject.
The authors successfully grapple with
much of the theory surrounding corpora-
tions and their ethical obligations. They
also present a full and multi-faceted pic-
ture of what CSR and the responsibilities
of business toward human rights are today
and what they need to be tomorrow.
David Weissbrodt*
University of Minnesota
* David Weissbrodt is the Regents Professor
of Law, the Fredrikson & Byron Professor of
Law, and the Co-Director of the Human Rights
Center at the University of Minnesota.
The author thanks Kyle Johnson, University
of Minnesota Law School J.D. 2009, for his
assistance in preparing this review.
44. Id. at 161.
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